THE FALLACY OF MISPLACED INTENTIONALITY IN SOCIAL REPRESENTATION RESEARCH

This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as indepe ndent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is show n that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explan atory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the resear chers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued t hat verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as ind ependent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the ' 'dependent'' overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of data must b e seen as two illustrations of the same representational contents. The researchers' preference for using verbal data to assess the independe nt variable and the tendency to introduce a causal relationship betwee n representation and behaviour is shown to result from misplacing folk -beliefs. Folk-beliefs about intentional causality, it is shown, perta in to the same level as other beliefs about the world on the part of t he subjects. Hence they are part of the folk-representation itself and must be treated as such; their use in scientific accounts of the beli ef-action relationship is not implied by data on rational belief syste ms. It is suggested to conceptualize social representations as integra l units of beliefs and action which may be used to explain causally su bsequent contingent social events. The function of folk-beliefs in int entional causality for the self-concept of rational people and for soc ial accountability is discussed.