THE DIFFICULTY OF THE LINDA CONJUNCTION PROBLEM CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO ITS SIMULTANEOUS CONCRETE AND UNNATURAL REPRESENTATION, AND NOT TO CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

To determine whether the high rate of conjunction errors (CEs) to the notorious Linda problem can be explained by the violation of implicit conversational rules, rather than by its concrete-unnatural representa tion, as proposed by cognitive-experiential self-theory, participants were given completely disclosing information. Although this procedure, directed toward a rational mode of information processing, reduced CE s, a majority of participants continued to make CEs. A graded series o f problems designed to activate latent, intuitive knowledge, but not a procedure designed to provide additional information of a rational na ture, additionally reduced CEs. The implications of the findings are d iscussed with respect to two independent, parallel modes of informatio n processing: experiential-intuitive and rational-analytic. In certain situations the outcome of the experiential-intuitive mode is more com pelling than that of the rational-analytical mode, even when the latte r is equally accessible. Our findings indicate that the resistance of the Linda problem to a probabilistic solution is even greater than pre viously suspected. (C) 1997 Academic Press