PROPERTY ATTRIBUTION IN METAPHOR COMPREHENSION

Metaphors of the form X is a Y may be conceived as statements of prope rty attribution, in which properties of the vehicle Y are attributed t o the topic X. The properties attributed from the vehicle to the topic are those that are epitomized by the vehicle, and may characterize a dimension of within-category variation in the topic. We report two exp eriments that tested the implications of this ''property attribution'' view of metaphor comprehension. One implication of this view is that metaphors are not implicitly transformed into comparisons (X is like a Y), but rather are understood as what they appear to be: class-inclus ion assertions. If metaphors are understood as class-inclusion asserti ons, they should either change meaning or become nonsensical when reve rsed. Experiment 1 provides evidence for this claim. A second implicat ion of the property attribution view is that topics and vehicles provi de different kinds of information to guide and constrain the comprehen sion process. Experiment 2 provides evidence for this claim. These fin dings cannot he accounted for by models which assume that metaphors ar e understood as implicit comparisons. (C) 1997 Academic Press.