This note examines the provision of campaign contributions made to inc
umbents seeking reelection to the 1984 California Assembly. The object
ive of this study is to recover attributes which successfully account
for the distribution of contributions across recipients while simultan
eously incorporating the transfer of resources among candidates into t
he analysis. This is done by estimating a statistical model which refl
ects a plausible relationship between the receipt of contributions and
candidate transfers. Previous research on campaign finance and electi
ons has emphasized the importance of legislative attributes such as co
mmittee assignment and seniority in determining the distribution of re
sources among candidates and discounts the role of considerations such
as electoral vulnerability. Simultaneous analysis of contributions an
d transfers indicates resources are distributed in a two-stage process
in which contributors first allocate money in accordance with standar
d accounts of interest group activity and candidates subsequently real
locate money among themselves for the purpose of supporting colleagues
facing strong electoral challenges.