COORDINATION RULES IN ASYMMETRIC SOCIAL DILEMMAS - A COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLIC GOOD DILEMMAS AND RESOURCE DILEMMAS

The present study focuses on differences between Public Good Dilemmas and Resource Dilemmas. As members of a four-person group, subjects eit her played a one-trial Public Good Dilemma or a one-trial Resource Dil emma. In the Public Good Dilemma, members learned that they were endow ed with a certain number of points and that they could obtain a bonus if as a group they would give more than 120 points. In the Resource Di lemma, members learned that they could take points from a certain sour ce and that they could obtain a bonus if they would leave more than 12 0 points in this source. In experiments 1 and 2, asymmetry of endowmen ts was induced: In the Public Good Dilemma, two members could give twi ce as many points as the other two, whereas in the Resource Dilemma, t wo members could take twice as many points as the other two. In experi ment 3, asymmetry of interests was induced: All members could give/tak e an equal number of points, but two members would receive 33% of the bonus whereas the other two would receive 17%. The results of these ex periments show that group members tend to coordinate their choice beha vior differently in these two dilemma situations. Members playing a Pu blic Good Dilemma tend to give in proportion to their endowments or in terest position. Members playing a Resource Dilemma coordinate choice behavior in a way that minimizes differences in final outcomes. (C) 19 95 Academic Press, Inc.