OPTIMAL PENAL CODES IN NEARLY SYMMETRICAL BERTRAND SUPERGAMES WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Authors
LAMBSON VE
Citation
Ve. Lambson, OPTIMAL PENAL CODES IN NEARLY SYMMETRICAL BERTRAND SUPERGAMES WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS, Journal of mathematical economics, 24(1), 1995, pp. 1-22
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods",Economics,"Mathematical, Methods, Social Sciences
Journal title
Journal of mathematical economics → ACNP
ISSN journal
03044068
Volume
24
Issue
1
Year of publication
1995
Pages
1 - 22
Database
ISI
SICI code
0304-4068(1995)24:1<1:OPCINS>2.0.ZU;2-3
Abstract
Previous work has demonstrated that optimal penal codes are security l evel penal codes in symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constr aints. This paper demonstrates that the result is robust to perturbati ons in the symmetry assumptions: as long as firms' discount factors, m arginal costs, and capacity constraints are not too dissimilar, optima l penal codes are 'almost always' security level penal codes.