THE ARMY RESERVE SOLDIER IN OPERATION DESERT-STORM - PERCEPTIONS OF BEING PREPARED FOR MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, AND COMBAT

In the mid-1970s, the Total Force policy shifted the active components ' combat support and service support to the reserve components. This p olicy made it necessary to mobilize and deploy reserve component force s in the event of a large-scale war. During the Persian Gulf War, 228, 000 reservists were called up, of which 139,207 were army reservists. The war, then, provided a test of the Total Force policy: Were the arm y reserve components ready for immediate mobilization and deployment i n support of combat missions? The present study obtained survey respon ses from panels of deployed (N=259) and nondeployed (N=576) army reser ve junior-ranking enlisted soldiers, before and after Operation Desert Storm. Perceptions of equipment and unit leadership preparation showe d significant moderate and positive relationships to soldier perceptio ns that he(she) and the unit were prepared to fight. Favorable spouse and employer attitudes toward reserve service (as reported by the sold ier) were significantly and positively related to the soldier's stated intent to stay in the army reserve, and negatively related to problem s caused by extended mobilization and deployment periods. Soldier perc eptions of how well their unit leadership was prepared and how well we ekend drill prepared them for war were significantly and positively re lated to reporting for mobilization and staying in the army reserve. I n contrast, both before and after Desert Storm, large percentages of d eployed and nondeployed soldiers reported problems in unit leadership, preparation in individual job and common soldier skills, and weekend drill personnel utilization.