SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON RESOLVING THE NORTH-KOREAN NUCLEAR QUESTION

Bringing Pyongyang into compliance with the NPT and its other nuclear obligations and keeping it there will require a persistent display of resolve by the international community, including strong leadership by the United States and the Republic of Korea. Both a sound legal archi tecture and major political change in the North must be achieved and s ustained. The bilateral October 1994 US-North Korean agreement was int ended to support both of these goals, but it contains within its struc ture and history elements which may work at cross purposes. Even if ul timately it helps resolve the Korean conflict satisfactorily, the impa ct of the October 1994 agreement elsewhere around the globe may compli cate nuclear nonproliferation more than it helps. These negative effec ts can be reduced, however, and positive aspects of the agreement enha nced if the international community takes steps to strengthen the cont ent of the anti-proliferation efforts now centered around the NPT and the dialogue between North and South Korea. That the necessary resolve will be displayed is not obvious. Given the political divisions withi n the world's democracies over the specifics of nonproliferation polic ies, the resurgence of the North-South dispute in the context of the N PT extension, and the spread of nuclear capability to nations less one rous or isolated than the DPRK, the international community's commitme nt to strong nonproliferation policies is not certain. Furthermore, su ccess in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program is only a necessar y, but not sufficient component of a successful global nonproliferatio n effort. The ultimate impact of the October 1994 US-DPRK agreement, l ike the final resolution of the Korean nuclear question, will not be s een for some time. Much will depend on how this agreement and that pro cess are perceived and how they are implemented. Most importantly, suc cess will be driven by attention to larger security, legal, political and economic considerations. One can imagine a very negative outcome i f the consequences of the new agreement are to subsidize a totalitaria n DPRK while failing to bring about significant political change, to u ndercut Seoul and/or the IAEA on inspections while failing to bring co mmensurate openness to the North, to call into question UN Security Co uncil resolve on nonproliferation matters while encouraging other nati ons to pursue nuclear programs in order to extract concessions, to ele vate Pyongyang's saber rattling to a rationale for concluding an agree ment while leaving unresolved during a dangerous period of transition the question of North Korea's nuclear capability, etc. At the same tim e, if we do not forget these fundamental considerations, a positive ou tcome remains within reach. If a subsidized North Korean nuclear progr am does facilitate the end of dictatorship or the beginning of peacefu l reunification it will enhance democracy and human rights to distant parts of the globe. If this disconcerting effort to ease Pyongyang out of its nuclear arms quest can be translated into a stronger nonprolif eration regime worldwide, the risk from weapons of mass destruction ma y be greatly reduced. If the lession for the UN Security Council is th at it must act sooner and with greater decisiveness toward threats to international security, and if it does peace will spread. Throughout a ll of this, the United States and the Republic of Korea, along with ot her friendly nations, must maintain the closest consultations to insur e that this dangerous period of transition is navigated safely.