WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT NUCLEAR-FORCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

By nearly common consent, the uncertainty over the status of nuclear f orces in Northeast Asia is said to be the most dangerous feature of As ian-Pacific security. While most attention has been paid to the status of North Korea's nuclear program, too little attention has been paid to the way in which the status of existing nuclear forces in the regio n affects the North Korea problem. It is true that the two largest ack nowledged nuclear powers, Russia and the United States, have been redu cing their forces in recent years, but they still remain by far the la rgest nuclear powers in the region. The main focus of this paper is to assess the status of nuclear forces in Northeast Asia in order to ide ntify ways in which the great powers and the states of the region can help limit the risks derived from North Korea's apparent attempt to ac quire a nuclear weapons capability. At the outset, it should be acknow ledged that this is not a paper about the complete denuclearization of Northeast Asia. While that may be an eventual objective, it will only come about as part of a broader denuclearization by the acknowledged nuclear powers. The United States, Russia and China deploy nuclear wea pons in the region because they see it as a vital arena of internation al affairs. All three powers have territory and vital interests in the region. The future of the nuclear weapons of these powers concerns th e problem of denuclearization, whereas the concerns over North Korea a nd Japan are threats of nuclear proliferation. These issues are distin ct, but linked, and it is the linkage which motivates and animates thi s paper.