SHOULD THE UNITED-STATES SUPPLY LIGHT-WATER REACTORS TO PYONGYANG

The transfer of light water reactor technology to North Korea emerged as an important issue at the third round of high-level talks between N orth Korea and the United States held in Geneva in July 1993. This art icle provides some background to the negotiations to date over this is sue, analyzes the relative proliferation intensity of the DPRK develop ing its present nuclear fuel cycle versus ''trading it in'' for a ligh t-water-reactor fuel cycle, and appraises nuclear power technology in terms of the DPRK's energy economy. Implications of the likely poor ec onomics of nuclear power in the DPRK and various constraints to transf erring LWR technology to the DPRK are examined, as well as critical ou tstanding issues that must be resolved before LWR technology is transf erred to the DPRK. In general, the proposed transfer of an LWR to the DPRK is found to be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it may sow ser pent's teeth by endowing the DPRK with a higher level of technical cap abilities to proliferate in the future, should the deal struck in Octo ber 1994 go sour. On the other, it may the basis on which the DPRK ree nters the NPT and IAEA safeguards system, and engages the United State s and its allies including the ROK. The real issue lies with how the a greement to transfer the LWR is implemented, not with the agreement it self.