LAND-BASED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN NORTHEAST ASIA - A SOUTH-KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

With the end of the Cold War, we have entered a period of transition i n which strategic uncertainty dominates and, consequently, more nation s feel less secure than during the Cold War period. We must manage thi s transitional period by devising and implementing proper measures to stabilize relations between states and to enhance security cooperation . Given the contextual and procedural characteristics of Northeast Asi a, structural arms-control measures seem premature, whereas there seem s to be much that confidence-building measures can achieve. CBMs can b e classified into transparency, constraint, and declaratory measures. While in some cases some form of CBMs has already been introduced, it is very difficult to introduce region-wide land-based CBMs due to the basic geographical attributes of Northeast Asia. There are, however, f our areas in which land-based CBMs might be applied: the Korean penins ula, Sino-Russian border, Sino-Vietnamese border, and Russo-Japanese t erritorial dispute. The Korean peninsula can be the first place to whe re we can apply land-based CBMs. While the two Koreas have already ado pted some form of CBMs, they have failed to implement them. The basic approach for arms control on the Korean peninsula should be an ''incre mental and phased'' approach that starts with the adoption of transpar ency measures with some minor constraint measures, which should be fol lowed by a set of more comprehensive/intrusive transparency measures, some major constraint measures, and verification measures. And proper institutionalization is required at the end of each phase. The first s et of CBMs include: exchange of military information; prior notificati on; demilitarization and conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone; and relocation of offensive weapons. With respect to other areas of concer n, the measures to stabilize the Chinese border with neighboring count ries are essential for the stability and peace of Northeast Asia. Form alization and further institutionalization of the already taken CBMs b etween Russia and China are required. China and Vietnam should engage in extensive negotiations for measures to stabilize the situation alon g their border. Demilitarization of the Northern Territories and imple mentation of the 1956 Joint Communique between Russia and Japan are ne cessary. We should utilize CBMs until we can become able to introduce structural arms-control measures. In the meantime, we should abide by certain principles in applying CBMs: increased openness and transparen cy, verification, notification, bilateral negotiations and cooperation together with multilateral security cooperation, and, most of all, st rong political will.