THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF VOTING TO DECLARE WAR

The conventional wisdom of national elections suggests that there are electoral costs associated with opposing declarations of war. However, an alternative literature contends that the negative electoral conseq uences of waging war may be borne by legislators who supported war, es pecially those members of the majority party. The authors test this as sumption by examining the electoral consequences of supporting or oppo sing the declarations of war for the Mexican-American War, World War I , and the 1991 resolution to use force in the Persian Gulf. The result s of their analysis of House elections indicate that although electora l costs were borne for opposing World War I, legislators who dissented often preselected themselves out of Congress through retirement or pu rsuit of other office. No evidence of electoral costs is evident in th e wake of the Persian Gulf War, due in part to the influence of electo ral costs is evident the long period between the end of the war and th e 1992 election.