This article examines Moscow's bargaining with the Maritime province i
n the framework of a two-level bargaining game in Northeast Asia. Diff
erences between Beijing and Tokyo over the nature of Northeast Asian s
ubregional economic development cooperation schemes found allies in Ru
ssian domestic politics with Moscow aligning with Beijing and Vladivos
tok aligning with Tokyo. These system-level differences fed into disag
reements between Moscow and Vladivostok as they bargained domestically
over budgetary allocation and tax remittances. These domestic-level d
ifferences obstructed Moscow's bargaining with Beijing and Tokyo over
bilateral issues. Moscow needed Primorye's compliance in these system-
level issues, and to get that compliance, Moscow promised large side p
ayments to Primorye, giving the province enhanced leverage with the ce
nter. It is simultaneous bargaining at two levels that produced this o
utcome. This study suggests that Russian center-local bargaining paral
lels Chinese center-local bargaining in the enhanced leverage the loca
lity derives from its transnational linkages.