RENEGOTIATION IN A REPEATED COURNOT DUOPOLY

Authors
DRIFFILL J SCHULTZ C
Citation
J. Driffill et C. Schultz, RENEGOTIATION IN A REPEATED COURNOT DUOPOLY, Economics letters, 47(2), 1995, pp. 143-148
Citations number
5
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Economics letters → ACNP
ISSN journal
01651765
Volume
47
Issue
2
Year of publication
1995
Pages
143 - 148
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(1995)47:2<143:RIARCD>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
We investigate a repeated Cournot duopoly with strictly convex cost fu nctions. In an example the set of Weakly Renegotiation Proof Equilibri um payoffs shrinks towards the joint profit maximizing payoff point as marginal costs are made to rise more rapidly.