COMMISSION-REVENUE MAXIMATION IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF ASSETCREATION

Authors
Citation
C. Hara, COMMISSION-REVENUE MAXIMATION IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF ASSETCREATION, Journal of economic theory, 65(1), 1995, pp. 258-298
Citations number
20
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00220531
Volume
65
Issue
1
Year of publication
1995
Pages
258 - 298
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-0531(1995)65:1<258:CMIAGE>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
A general equilibrium model of endogenous asset formation is given in which a monopolistic agent, called the designer, can create any types of assets and charage commissions as long as the total number of the t ypes of assets does not exceed some given constant. When the designer can create at most two assets, a commission-revenue maximizer always e xists. Otherwise, it may not. Moreover, the so-called epsilon-maximize rs may be badly behaved. A (profit) maximizer may not exist even when the number of types of assets is endogenously determined from a positi ve fixed cost of creating an asset. Journal of Economic Literature Cla ssification Numbers: D52, D80. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.