HOW PERCEPTIONS INFLUENCE THE RISK OF WAR

We identify conditions for which perceptual differences diminish the r isk of war and others for which differences in perceptions increase th e likelihood of warfare. We show empirically on a data set concerning 469 European disputes between 1816 and 1970 that these game-theoretic conditions are a significant improvement over the decision-theoretic v iew suggested by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1986) and help resolve some concerns raised by Jervis (1989). The expectations from the game are empirically robust in the face of bipolarity/multipolarity, a vari able commonly thought to be important by structural realists or neorea lists. Differences in perceptions need not be thought of as purely idi osyncratic phenomena with unpredictable consequences for events. Nor i s it necessary to rely on ex post, thick analysis of specific events t o portray the relationship between perceptions and outcomes. Rather, w e identify a formulation that allows ex ante predictions of how decisi on makers will behave in crisis situations based on their perceptions of the circumstances they find themselves in.