J. Bendor et P. Swistak, TYPES OF EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United Statesof America, 92(8), 1995, pp. 3596-3600
The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental
importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims ha
ve been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod
, R. and Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized
conclusion is that cooperative rules such as ''tit for tat'' are evol
utionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD),
Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London)
327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stab
le in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictor
y by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be sta
ble and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evo
lutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in gen
eral. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report
the!orems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in th
is sense. We first show that the IPD has ''too many'' such strategies,
so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. St
able strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for the
ir evolutionary survival-the size of the invasion they can resist. Thi
s property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness.
Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most
robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the mos
t robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hard
est to disrupt.