EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE

Authors
Citation
H. Mehran, EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE, Journal of financial economics, 38(2), 1995, pp. 163-184
Citations number
53
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Business Finance
ISSN journal
0304405X
Volume
38
Issue
2
Year of publication
1995
Pages
163 - 184
Database
ISI
SICI code
0304-405X(1995)38:2<163:ESOAFP>2.0.ZU;2-J
Abstract
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly -selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supportin g advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to i ncrease firm value, Firm performance is positively related to the perc entage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compe nsation that is equity-based. Moreover, equity-based compensation is u sed more extensively in firms with more outside directors. Finally, fi rms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use less equity-based compensation.