This paper uses a numerical model to examine the long-run impact of a
radical liberalization of the West-European natural gas markets. We st
udy profit maximizing Cournot producers facing an ideal third party ac
cess regime for gas transport. Producers sell gas either to large user
s in the manufacturing industry and to gas-fired thermal power plants,
or to local distribution companies. We first examine the case where n
o traders exploit arbitrage possibilities and some producers have limi
ted access to the markets. In this equilibrium net prices differ acros
s markets. These differences disappear in the second case where trader
s are introduced. The third case focuses on a complete European market
for natural gas in which traders exploit all arbitrage possibilities
and all producers can sell gas in all markets. We also study the impac
t on the complete European market of changes in costs for production,
transport, and distribution. Finally, welfare implications from a libe
ralization of the West-European natural gas markets are discussed. We
argue that a radical liberalization could increase economic welfare in
Western Europe by 15% to 20% in the long run.