Core allocations may be defined for infinite horizon capital accumulat
ion models. If agents cannot trust each other in the sense of Gale, th
en agents may renege on their commitments; their decisions appear time
inconsistent. A core allocation is a recursive core allocation provid
ed no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time gi
ven its accumulation of assets up to that period. We show for every al
location of consumption in the initial core, one can find a distributi
on of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents wil
l break the initial core contract at any date. It follows that if the
proper distribution of the streams of capital is achieved, then the al
location in the core is also in the recursive core. The latter therefo
re forges a link between the distribution of wealth (capital), the pro
blem of trust, and time consistent intertemporal contracts.