LIMITS ON AUTHORITARIAN IMPOSITION OF POLICY - FAILED ECUADORIAN MILITARY POPULISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Does regime type affect policy outcomes? Do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes? The empirical evid ence is ambiguous. Using two cases of failed military populism in Ecua dor, the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics-lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization-frustrated implem entation of import substitution policies. Ironically, groups expected to benefit most-industrialists and urban workers-provided the principa l opposition. Although the regime needed their cooperation to implemen t policy, neither group had assurance that its interests were protecte d. Thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support; regimes must make their commitments credible by permittin g the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whos e cooperation is needed for policy implementation. This conclusion is supported by a comparison to Peru (where a military regime encountered similar obstacles) and Argentina (where a democratically elected mili tary officer, Peron, was able to implement import substitution policie s).