VOTES WITHOUT POWER - PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AS MUTUAL CONTROL IN MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS

In an application of procedural justice theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Ty ler, 1989) to the domain of intergroup relations, we investigated just ice preferences among members of numerical majority and minority group s as a function of two parameters: the number of representatives allot ted to each group, and the decision rule used to determine the outcome (ranging from simple majority vote to unanimity). In the first study, minority group members perceived the combination of proportional repr esentation and majority vote to be significantly less fair than all ot her combinations, and their choices of procedure stressed ''mutual con trol'' (when the decision rule exceeds the number of representatives p ossessed by either group). In a second study, majority group members p erceived the combination of equal representation and majority vote to be significantly less fair than other procedures, but their choices of procedure did involve a considerable degree of mutual control. These findings suggest that there may be some basis for agreement between ma jority and minority group members' justice preferences and that both g roups may perceive situations of mutual control to be acceptable. A th ird study involving both majority and minority group members ruled out an interpretation of the previous results in terms of motivation to m aintain vs. change the status quo.