In a voluntary health insurance market, risk selection poses serious a
nd increasing problems. Responding to this concern, the Robert Wood Jo
hnson Foundation sponsored an invitational meeting for public and priv
ate decision makers to understand the incentives for risk selection in
the health insurance market and to discuss options for reducing risk
selection practices. The meeting, held October 6, 1994, provided a fra
mework for exploring this timely issue and served as a vehicle for und
erstanding how health care reforms, such as insurance market regulatio
n and risk adjustment mechanisms, both can reduce and exacerbate incen
tives for risk selection. This article sets the context for the three
commissioned papers that follow; it summarizes the ideas presented and
issues identified for future consideration. Failure to address risk s
election will continue to have serious consequences both for access to
care for vulnerable populations and for the financial viability of he
alth plans.