Numerous studies have demonstrated that the attitudes people consider
personally important have an enhanced impact on cognition and behavior
. This article explores the possibility that importance may regulate t
he magnitude of the false consensus effect as well. The authors report
on six experiments that involved a variety of subject samples (colleg
e students and the general population), data collection methods (telep
hone interviewing and self-administered questionnaires), and political
issues (e.g., abortion, gun control, defense spending). Meta-analyses
summarizing the results of 12 tests revealed a strong false consensus
effect but no reliable relation between its magnitude and attitude im
portance. These results are inconsistent with the assumption that the
false consensus effect is a result of attitudes directly or indirectly
influencing perceptions of others, and they lend support to explanati
ons of the false consensus effect that posit other mechanisms (i.e., a
ttribution and object construal).