THE ROLE OF VALUES IN PREDICTING FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS AND SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION

Affirmative action is one of the most controversial current public pol icies-public support has never reached a majority of the electorate fo r most versions of affirmative action. Many people oppose affirmative action on the grounds that it violates norms of procedural fairness an d meritocracy, in spite of the fact that they also support egalitarian values consistent with it. This article explores this apparent parado x by testing reactions to affirmative action in college admissions by comparing three models positing differing roles for values in ideologi cal reasoning: (1) a central role for values-Tetlock's (1986) value pl uralism model, (2) a secondary role for values-Lind's (1992) fairness heuristic hypothesis, and (3) no role for values-affective explanation s (i.e., Jackman, 1978). Results support the fairness heuristic hypoth esis-subjective assessments of fairness play a mediating role between personal values and support for affirmative action. These results indi cate that values play a significant role in determining support for af firmative action. To more fully understand how people reason about aff irmative action, however, values research must be yoked with justice r esearch.