STUDYING COURTS COMPARATIVELY - THE VIEW FROM THE AMERICAN STATES

In this study, we perform a basic exercise to illustrate the vital inf luence of institutional rules and structures on judicial behavior, and the importance of recognizing this influence in models of judicial ch oice. Specifically, we estimate several models of state supreme court justices' voting on the death penalty. Beginning with a simple prefere nces model, an institutional model, and an additive preferences-instit utional model, we explore the extent to which our understanding of jud icial behavior is enhanced or changed through models that include the interactive effects of institutional features with other sources of in fluence on judicial choice. Our most fundamental point, clearly suppor ted by the results, is that the effects of case facts, personal attrib utes, and environmental features are conditioned by institutional arra ngements. Any explanation of judicial choice must consider carefully t he impact of institutional context on the exercise of judicial discret ion. Through this approach, the inconsistencies among findings and the ory in the judicial behavior literature can be reconciled, and a gener al theory of judicial choice can be developed.