REASON AND WILL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY

Social contract theorists rely upon the idea of agreement as a framewo rk for justification, but differ in their characterization of the part ies to agreement. Some contract theorists, such as Buchanan and Gauthi er, begin with willful agents who are moved solely by their own subjec tive ends. Rawls, on the other hand, imagines an agreement reached by parties who are moved exclusively by impersonal concerns, which make n o reference at all to the parties' particular commitments. This paper critizes both of these contract views, arguing that subjectivist contr act theories fail to acknowledge the role of impersonal reasons in bri nging persons to a principled accommodation, while Rawls rejects the l egitimate moral claims arising from our particularity. The paper defen ds an alternative contract view, which envisions an agreement reached by persons who are partial to their own interests, but willing to cons ider impartially the claims of others.