In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I addres
s the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictiona
ry (''the OED'') defines in its six main entries under the word consci
ousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of conscio
usness(4), by (a) identifying the previous three OED concepts of consc
iousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, a
nd (b) by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively
, by means of those three concepts is related to the referents of the
concept of consciousness(4). I then address the latter concept more di
rectly by pursuing for the remainder of the article where the OED's fo
urth entry leads. Among other things, I am led to consider two competi
ng accounts of consciousness(4) that figure prominently in the OED ent
ry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of William Hamilto
n and the inner-eye, perceptionlike account of John Locke. Both kinds
of account are very much with us today.