ECONOMIC AND REFERENDUM VOTING - A COMPARISON OF GUBERNATORIAL AND SENATORIAL ELECTIONS

We compare vote choice in senate and gubernatorial elections from 1986 and 1990 with two retrospective voting hypotheses: the national refer endum hypothesis and an economic retrospective hypothesis. Despite the similarities between the office of U.S. senator and governor (same co nstituency, high levels of campaign spending, highly visible candidate s, etc.), we find that different types of retrospective evaluations ar e used with respect to vote choice. As members of the national legisla tive branch, senators' fortunes are linked to the success or failures of the president. In contrast, governors, as state executives, are hel d accountable for perceived state economic conditions, while senators escape unscathed from the same general economic evaluations. These fin dings shed some light on the nature of vote choice in a political syst em complicated by federalism and separation of powers.