SELF-CONTROL AND BELIEF

Authors
Citation
Ar. Mele, SELF-CONTROL AND BELIEF, Philosophical psychology, 7(4), 1994, pp. 419-435
Citations number
28
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology,Philosophy
Journal title
ISSN journal
09515089
Volume
7
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
419 - 435
Database
ISI
SICI code
0951-5089(1994)7:4<419:SAB>2.0.ZU;2-N
Abstract
Although the extent to which motivational factors are involved in the production and sustaining of biased or 'irrational' beliefs continues to be a controversial issue in social psychology, even those who urge that such beliefs are often explained by non-motivational tendencies a dmit that biased beliefs sometimes have motivational sources. Sometime s we are influenced by motivational pressures in ways proscribed by pr inciples that we accept for belief-acquisition or belief-revision ('do xastic' principles). Many garden-variety instances of self-deception a re cases in point. We are not always helpless victims of those pressur es, however. This paper examines the nature of doxastic self-control ( roughly, a capacity to counteract motivational pressures that incline us to acquire or retain beliefs that would violate our doxastic princi ples) and explores our prospects for avoiding motivationally biased be lieving by exercising self-control.