Etiologic research in psychiatry relies on an objectivist epistemology
positing that human cognition is specified by the ''reality'' of the
outer world, which consists of a totality of mind-independent objects.
Truth is considered as some sort of correspondence relation between w
ords and external objects, and mind as a mirror of nature. In our view
, this epistemology considerably impedes etiologic research. Objectivi
st epistemology has been recently confronting a growing critique from
diverse scientific fields. Alternative models in neurosciences (neuron
al selection), artificial intelligence (connectionism), and developmen
tal psychology (developmental biodynamics) converge in viewing living
organisms as self-organizing systems, In this perspective, the organis
m is not specified by the outer world, but enacts its environment by s
electing relevant domains of significance that constitute its world. T
he distinction between mind and body or organism and environment is a
matter of observational perspective. These models from empirical scien
ces are compatible with fundamental tenets of philosophical phenomenol
ogy and hermeneutics. They imply consequences for research in psychopa
thology: symptoms cannot be viewed as disconnected manifestations of d
iscrete localized brain dysfunctions. Psychopathology should therefore
focus on how the person's self-coherence is maintained and on the und
erstanding and empirical investigation of the systemic laws that gover
n neurodevelopment and the organization of human cognition. Copyright
(C) 1995 by W.B. Saunders Company