In a wide range of animal species, males coerce females to mate with t
hem, either by physically forcing them to mate, by harassing them unti
l they mate or by punishing persistent refusal to mate. The first sect
ion of this paper argues that the possibility of forced copulation can
generate arms races between males and females that may have substanti
al costs to both sexes. In the second section, it is suggested that se
xual harassment commonly represents a 'war of attrition' between the s
exes; existing game theory models that may apply to sexual conflict ov
er mating decisions are reviewed. The third section develops a simple
prospective model for the evolution of intimidation by punishment in s
ituations where males can raise the probability that females will acce
pt their advances in future by punishing them for refusal to mate. Whe
re the benefits of sexual coercion to males are high, all three male s
trategies may develop to a point where they have substantial costs to
females. In the final section, evidence that female behaviour is adapt
ed to minimizing these costs is reviewed.