MOTIVATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL, MARKET-BASED, AND VOLUNTARIST ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

Historically, regulatory command-and-control schemes have dominated th e environmental policy process. Recently, market-based incentives and voluntarist programs have begun to compete with regulatory policies. W e argue in this article that policymakers must distinguish these strat egies by their motivational underpinnings. While each strategy attempt s to achieve the same goal, behavioral or organizational change that r educes pollution and/or provides environmental protection, each strate gy is distinct in its means. We discuss how command-and-control capita lizes on fear, market-based incentives capitalize on greed, and volunt arism on one's sense of social responsibility. We discuss the implicat ions of choosing each of these policy alternatives by drawing on the i nsights of ''social dilemmas'' research that analyzes situations in wh ich the individual and the collective good are in conflict.