PARTISAN DIVISIONS AND VOTING DECISIONS - US SENATORS, GOVERNORS, ANDTHE RISE OF A DIVIDED FEDERAL-GOVERNMENT

This paper argues that existing research on divided government has ign ored the intergovernmental dimensions and implications of this phenome non. We address the intergovernmental case by exploring the historical rise and micro-level foundations of divided outcomes among same-state U.S. senator and governor pairs. The electoral results for senator-go vernor pairs lie at the intersection of state and national-level divid ed government, and are subject to the same historical and electoral fo rces that have shaped these other divided outcomes. We trace the histo rical rise of split outcomes in these contests, outline the theoretica l and policy implications of these results, and offer an analysis of i ndividual-level voting behavior intended to compare two competing expl anations for divided outcomes: the ''simple party loyalty model'' and our own ''comparative informational relevance model''.