AN EXTENSION OF THE SORENSEN-KALLEBERG THEORY OF THE LABOR-MARKET MATCHING AND ATTAINMENT PROCESSES

In this article, I advance the theory of the labor market matching and attainment processes outlined in Sorensen and Kalleberg (1981) and pr ovide an empirical test of the new specification. I extend the Sorense n-Kalleberg theory by elaborating (1) the role of the individual actio ns of employers and workers and (2) the relationship among resources h eld by employers and workers, resources desired by employers and worke rs, and the structure of control in the labor market. Consequences of these relations for reward attainment are discussed, and a model is de rived for the matching and attainment processes. Data from the 1991 Ge neral Social Survey Work Organization Module are used to test these hy potheses. Consistent with the theory, the results show that in a close d system, the matching process accounts for over 50 percent of the var iance in wage attainment for men and for women. Results also suggest t hat men benefit more than do women from closed systems originating sol ely from either job ladders or from skill. Closed systems originating from both job ladders and skill benefit men and women equally.