SYMPOSIUM - THE DIRECTIONAL THEORY OF ISSUE VOTING .2. DIRECTIONAL AND PROXIMITY MODELS OF VOTER UTILITY AND CHOICE - A NEW SYNTHESIS AND AN ILLUSTRATIVE TEST OF COMPETING MODELS

Citation
S. Merrill et B. Grofman, SYMPOSIUM - THE DIRECTIONAL THEORY OF ISSUE VOTING .2. DIRECTIONAL AND PROXIMITY MODELS OF VOTER UTILITY AND CHOICE - A NEW SYNTHESIS AND AN ILLUSTRATIVE TEST OF COMPETING MODELS, Journal of theoretical politics, 9(1), 1997, pp. 25-48
Citations number
39
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
09516298
Volume
9
Issue
1
Year of publication
1997
Pages
25 - 48
Database
ISI
SICI code
0951-6298(1997)9:1<25:S-TDTO>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
Under the assumption that a voter's utility is maximized when s/he cho oses the candidate/party that is closest to the voter's own most prefe rred set of policies, the Downsian proximity model of voter choice has become the standard method for modeling the linkage between the polic y preferences of voters and the policy positions of candidates. Altern ative spatial models of voter utility and voter choice - based on dire ctional criteria - have been proposed by Matthews and by Rabinowitz an d Macdonald. The relative fit of models can best be addressed by nesti ng seemingly disparate models in a unified statistical framework which embodies proximity, directional and intensity components and which ha s each of the 'pure' models as a special case. Theory suggests the nee d to distinguish the ability to predict distinct shapes of voter utili ty functions from the ability to predict voter choice. Using data on t he voter utility functions for major candidates for the US presidency during the period 1980-92, we show that the best fit incorporates all three components with intensity significantly more prominent for chall engers while the Matthews directional model - which de-emphasizes inte nsity - is preferred to the Rabinowitz/Macdonald version for incumbent s. Differing utility functions for incumbent and challenger imply that the former should seek the center while the latter espouses strong st ands. We show that the marked preference for the model obtained by Rab inowitz and Macdonald using mean issue placements of the candidates is greatly reduced with voter-specific candidate placements, even after adjusting for projection. However, when we shift from utility function s to voter choice, we find no significant difference in predictive pow er between the proximity and directional models.