PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND PLATFORM SELECTION IN MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS

The literature on stochastic voting to date has focused almost exclusi vely on models with only two candidates (or parties). This paper studi es multiparty competition with stochastic voting. We look at two diffe rent models in which candidates aim to maximize their expected vote, a s well as a model where the objective of candidates is rank minimizati on. The equilibria of these models are derived and characterized. We s how that the properties of the equilibria are quite different from tho se derived in deterministic models. Furthermore, the analysis shows th at deterministic voting models are not robust since the introduction o f even a minute level of uncertainty leads to a drastic change in pred ictions. Consequently, we argue that the deterministic model provides a misleading benchmark. Stochastic models provide a much richer framew ork, and the nature of the uncertainty in voter choice is a key determ inant of the qualitative properties of the equilibria.