STATE LEGISLATORS IN CONGRESS - STRATEGIC POLITICIANS, PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURES, AND THE PARTY NEXUS

Authors
Citation
Mb. Berkman, STATE LEGISLATORS IN CONGRESS - STRATEGIC POLITICIANS, PROFESSIONAL LEGISLATURES, AND THE PARTY NEXUS, American journal of political science, 38(4), 1994, pp. 1025-1055
Citations number
43
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00925853
Volume
38
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
1025 - 1055
Database
ISI
SICI code
0092-5853(1994)38:4<1025:SLIC-S>2.0.ZU;2-0
Abstract
This research explores the reasons for the increased number of former state legislators in the House of Representatives. Like other experien ced politicians, former state legislators strategically assess the opp ortunities presented by an election and run for Congress when their pr ospects look most favorable. But these electron-specific factors canno t explain either state differences in career paths or the greater numb ers of former state legislators, rather than other experienced politic ians, in the House. Using pooled cross-sectional data from 1940 to 199 2, I test the importance of the state legislative context within which strategic politicians make their decision to run. Democrats' decision are shaped by the funding opportunities offered to them in profession alized state legislatures; Republican decisions are shaped by the oppo rtunities presented by the state legislature for poweer and influence relative to those offered by minority status in the House. Professiona lized state legislatures have also had more of an impact on the qualit y of the Democratic party's candidate pool for Congress than they have for the Republican's.