PROSPECTIONS, RETROSPECTIONS, AND RATIONALITY - THE BANKERS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RECONSIDERED

Citation
Hd. Clarke et Mc. Stewart, PROSPECTIONS, RETROSPECTIONS, AND RATIONALITY - THE BANKERS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RECONSIDERED, American journal of political science, 38(4), 1994, pp. 1104-1123
Citations number
42
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
00925853
Volume
38
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
1104 - 1123
Database
ISI
SICI code
0092-5853(1994)38:4<1104:PRAR-T>2.0.ZU;2-P
Abstract
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) recently have challenged a long-s tanding conventional wisdom by claiming that sociotropic prospections dominate presidential approval models. Net of long-term expectations a bout the economy, judgments about its past performance are not signifi cant. However, when nonstationarity in the time series of interest is taken into account, analyses of models similar to MacKuen, Erikson, an d Stimson's and analyses of an alternative error correction model both indicate that retrospections as well as prospections are influential. They also contend that the electorate forms its economic expectations according to a rational expectations model. This claim is unfounded b ecause their analyses and data are inadequate for assessing it.