IS PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVE - COERCIVE STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL-EXCHANGE

This research tests competing predictions about the effectiveness of c oercive strategies in social exchange. Both the classical exchange the ories and most bargaining theories argue that the actual use of punish ment in exchange relations provokes hostility and retaliation, and lea ds to a decrease rather than an increase in mutually rewarding exchang e. I argue instead that more frequent use of contingent punishment wou ld increase the effectiveness of punishment power. Although the motiva tion to minimize loss constrains the use of punishment, that motivatio n should make it highly effective when used. An experiment tested thes e predictions, using computer-simulated actors who were programmed to employ varying levels of contingent punishment, under different struct ures of punishment power, against a partner with a reward power advant age. In support of my predictions, more frequent punishment for nonexc hange increased the partner's reward exchange without increasing retal iation or negative affect. Punishment that was both strong and consist ent produced the highest frequency of reward exchange and the least ne gative affect toward the partner.