AGENCY, HUMANITARIANISM AND INTERVENTION

This article examines some of the justifications that have been proffe red as to why ''we'' should sacrifice in the name of common humanity. The first section examines the views of two leading thinkers who rejec t the statist paradigm, Bhikhu Parekh and Michael Waiter. Focusing on Parekh's and Waiter's conception of the state as a moral agent, and th eir conviction that states should engage in humanitarian intervention, the article argues that the problematic nature of the state as a mora l agent is posed most starkly in relation to military humanitarian int ervention. The theme of the second section is the critique of foundati onalist claims to moral knowledge. Non-foundationalists emphasize the contingent nature of human solidarity, and this article focuses on the work of Richard Rorty. He is very critical of the claim that it is po ssible to construct a non-foundationalist universalism, and this contr overy is increasingly prominent in the discipline of international rel ations. The final part of the article analyzes the attempt by Richard Falk and Ken Booth to construct a non-foundationalist defence of ethic al universalism. By focusing on both foundationalist and non-foundatio nalist theories of human solidarity, the article attempts to provide i nsights into the question of how far different metatheoretical positio ns lead to different views of moral agency.