Does the recognition of human rights in international law undermine th
e traditional conception of international society as a society of sove
reign states? The internal jurisdictional sovereignty of states is lim
ited by those provisions and the non-intervention rule appears to be b
reached, but the most fundamental notion of sovereignty for internatio
nal society is the absolute sense of not being subject to a superior a
uthority. The notion of absolute sovereignty is examined with regard t
o the individual state on its own and it is argued that the only accep
table notion of absolute sovereignty is that of the general will of a
political association, which is an ideal entity with a built-in moral
structure of equal rights. Applied to international society, it is arg
ued that the constitutional sovereign can only be the collective of st
ates; this constitutional authority must itself be grounded in the sov
ereignty of the general will of international society, whose constitue
nts are immediately the states but ultimately the general will of all
the members of the different states. Since the general will is ideal w
ith a built-in structure of equal rights of the human rights type, the
recognition of human rights in international law is not a curtailment
of this sovereignty but an expression of it.