REASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHILDRENS SCIENCE INSTRUCTION

Science curricula at the elementary school level frequently emphasize the ''concrete,'' with a focus on the processes of observation, orderi ng, and categorization of the directly perceivable. Within this approa ch, abstract ideas and the planning of investigations and analysis of their results are in large part postponed until higher grades. This pr actice stems from purported developmental constraints on children's th inking. This article analyzes these constraints in light of the writin gs of Piaget, to whom they are frequently attributed, and contemporary developmental theory and research. Neither the Piagetian nor the non- Piagetian research supports the validity of these developmental assump tions. The article also identifies several intrinsic problematic aspec ts of this approach to children's science, including the failure to ap preciate the challenge of adequate scientific description, the liabili ties of decontextualization, and the epistemological messages it conve ys to children. Both Piagetian and non-Piagetian literatures support t he feasibility of children's science curricula in which the processes previously approached as ends become tools in contextualized and authe ntic scientific inquiry.