A RESPONSE TO GRAF AND KOMATSUS CRITIQUE OF THE PROCESS DISSOCIATION PROCEDURE - WHEN IS CAUTION NECESSARY

In a recent paper, Graf and Komatsu (1994) argued that the process dis sociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) is limited in its ability to separa te and measure conscious and unconscious forms of memory and so should be ''handled with caution''. Given that the study of unconscious infl uences has always posed a difficult problem for memory researchers, we agree with the general emphasis on caution. In this paper, we too adv ocate caution, especially as it applies to the use of indirect tests, assessing Graf and Komatsu's critique, and using the process dissociat ion procedure. We address the substantive issues raised by Graf and Ko matsu and also point out the errors, both factual and logical, in thei r paper. Any method proposing to provide separate measures of consciou s and unconscious influences requires judicious use and a careful exam ination of its underlying assumptions. The assumptions underlying the process dissociation framework are supported by a large number of expe riments spanning a diverse range of conditions. In contrast, the assum ptions underlying implicit/explicit test comparisons, when articulated , are found to be flawed and no solutions seem forthcoming. The proces s dissociation procedure offers researchers the most promising approac h for disentangling conscious and unconscious influences.