HOW NOT TO MURDER YOUR NEIGHBOR - USING SYNTHETIC BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY TO STUDY AGGRESSIVE SIGNALING

The scientific account of intraspecific aggressive signaling is incomp lete. in part, this is because it is difficult to identify the consequ ences (for the nature of signaling systems) of the different ecologica l contexts in which signaling has developed. The goal of our investiga tion is to complement the ongoing work in the biological sciences on t his issue. Using a theoretical framework that we call synthetic behavi oral ecology, we perform a series of experiments involving populations of simulated animals (animals) that, in their simulated world, must c ompete for food. When animals pick up reliable information about the ' 'strength'' of other animals within sensory range, a coherent form of collective behavior develops, which we call minimal territoriality. We then introduce the signaling of aggressive intentions. Each individua l has a bluffing strategy that is determined by a form of artificial e volution in which there is no explicit fitness function. By varying, i n energy terms, the cost of producing aggressive signals, and by analy zing the population dynamics at different costs of signaling, we are a ble to provide evidence that the handicap principle (according to whic h higher costs enforce honesty) can apply in multiagent ecologies. We then suggest how variations in the cost of signaling affect the territ orial behavior. The article ends with a discussion of She current mode l and identification of some directions for future research.