Gc. Vankooten et A. Scott, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENT, AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN CANADA, Canadian public policy, 21(2), 1995, pp. 233-249
This paper examines the assignment of functions over natural resources
and environment between the federal and provincial governments using
the Breton-Scott (1978) approach to the optimal assignment of function
s and, alternatively, studying the actual policy outcomes under the ex
isting assignment of powers. On theoretical grounds, provincial contro
l over natural resources is warranted as long as the external costs im
posed on other jurisdictions are small, but the theoretical approach d
oes not unequivocally assign powers to either the provinces or Ottawa.
In practice, as illustrated by examples, natural resource policies ar
e driven not by concern over social costs and benefits, but by politic
al considerations that impose added costs on the economy.