A THEORY OF SOCIAL DECISIONS

Decisions that affect groups of people can be made by individuals, by larger subsets of the group, or by the whole group. Decisions can resu lt in rules, or they can be tailored to particular cases. They can be made by those affected or by others. These three distinctions generate ten types of social decisions (omitting two impossible cases). I disc uss the advantages and disadvantages of these various types, in partic ular: usefulness in bringing about cooperation or coordination; equity ; incentive; speed; effort; participation; sensitivity to the differen ces among cases; susceptibility to error and abuse; and the costs of e ducation and enforcement. Different methods of decision making also de fine different virtues and vices. The model presented makes empirical predictions, and it provides a prescriptive framework for examining in stitutional practices. Decisions that affect groups of people can be m ade by individuals, by larger subsets of the group, or by the whole gr oup. Decisions can result in rules, or they can be tailored to particu lar cases. They can be made by those affected or by others. These thre e distinctions generate ten types of social decisions (omitting two im possible cases). I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these v arious types, in particular: usefulness in bringing about cooperation or coordination; equity; incentive; speed; effort; participation; sens itivity to the differences among cases; susceptibility to error and ab use; and the costs of education and enforcement. Different methods of decision making also define different virtues and vices. The model pre sented makes empirical predictions, and it provides a prescriptive fra mework for examining institutional practices.