THE CONTROL OF ACTIONS BY AGENTS

Reasons, it was suggested, are at best necessary conditions of actions . But why is this so? According to theories of agent causality, reason s incline but do not compel because actions are controlled by persons. But what are persons, we then inquired, and what gives them control? Empirical evidence indicated that reflective consciousness is what giv es persons control. It was then assumed that reflective consciousness divides into two types: a primary, intrinsic (self-intimational) kind, and a secondary, extrinsic, conceptual kind. The first sort, we sugge sted, gives us immediate contact with out bodies and some of our menta l processes, and enables us to direct our activities towards goals. Th e second sort gives us the power to refrain. In line with a modified v ersion of Locke, it was then proposed that the property that gives you control over your behaviour, namely reflective consciousness, is the very thing that makes you a person.