CARING RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ENVIRONMENTS

A relational-self theory claims that one's self is constituted by one' s relationships. The type of ethics that is said to arise from this co ncept of self is often called an ethics of care, whereby the focus of ethical deliberation is on preserving and nurturing those relationship s. Some environmental philosophers advocating a relational-self theory tend to assume that the particular relationships that constitute the self will prioritize the natural world. I question this assumption by introducing the problem of artifact relationships. It is unclear wheth er a relational-self theory recognizes relationships with the artifici al world as being meaningful in any moral sense, and whether such rela tionships, if they can exist, should be accorded equal value to relati onships with the natural world. The problem of artifact relationships becomes particularly apparent when the relational-self theory is linke d to place-based ethics. If our ethics are to develop from our relatio ns to place, and our place is largely an artificial world, is there no t a danger that our ethical deliberations will tend to neglect the nat ural world? I adapt Holmes Rolston's concept of ''storied residence'' to show how the inclusion of the artificial world will lead to differe nt questions regarding one's resident environment, and perhaps a diffe rent emphasis on what is valued. My aim in raising these questions is to challenge the optimism that writers such as Karen Warren and Jim Ch eney have shown in supporting relational-self theories and place-based ethics. I conclude that the challenge to develop a relational-self/pl ace-based ethic does not appear to have been met within Western enviro nmental philosophy, which has perpetuated a silence on the matter of o ur embedment in the artificial world.