MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND WAGE SETTING LEVEL IN SYMMETRICAL NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES

Authors
CAHUC P
Citation
P. Cahuc, MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND WAGE SETTING LEVEL IN SYMMETRICAL NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES, Economics letters, 48(3-4), 1995, pp. 427-432
Citations number
11
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Economics letters → ACNP
ISSN journal
01651765
Volume
48
Issue
3-4
Year of publication
1995
Pages
427 - 432
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(1995)48:3-4<427:MPAWSL>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
This paper shows that the relationship between the wage and the extent of centralisation of the wage setting is necessarily monotonic in sym metric non-cooperative games between monopoly trade unions, if the gam e for each wage setting level has only one equilibrium. Moreover, when the conditions of stability of Nash equilibria are fulfilled, the tra de unions' welfare rises with the degree of centralisation.